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The Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate at its fourth session requested the 
Secretariat to compile proposals relating to the treatment of quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) and policies and measures. This paper 
focuses on the principles for the development of new commitments. The paper does 




A key element of the New Zealand position is that emissions reductions should be 
achieved at global least cost. A least cost approach does not neglect equity; rather, a 
least cost approach improves the prospects of finding an equitable outcome acceptable 
to all.  
 
Targets 
•  in setting targets, Parties should focus on the primary objective of the Convention 
which is to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, rather 
than setting potentially unachievable near-term targets as endpoints in 
themselves  
•  in order to achieve genuine flexibility over when abatement occurs consideration 
needs to be given to commitments developed in cumulative terms in relation to a 
time-frame sufficient to capture changes in technology and turnover of the capital 
stock  
•  the tension between full flexibility over when abatement occurs, and the need to 
have milestones to lend credibility to any agreement, should be recognised and 
addressed transparently  
•  one approach to addressing the tension between credibility and flexibility would 
be to specify an emissions envelope which became more stringent over time and 
allow any over-achievement in terms of emissions reductions to be carried 
forward or banked for future use  
Least cost policy 
•  where practical and cost effective, action should be taken to address all sources 
and sinks of greenhouse gases    2
•  contributions should be welcomed from developing countries as to how a 
transition to effective global action might best be achieved in the longer term  
•  equating the marginal costs of abatement across opportunities minimises overall 
costs, and economic instruments including emissions trading and carbon charges 
are effective ways to achieve this  
•  mandatory harmonised policies and measures are unlikely to prove least cost 
due to variations in individual countries' circumstances; however, areas where 
common action may be appropriate include removal of fossil fuel subsidies, the 
treatment of international aviation and marine bunker fuels, and protocols for 
emissions trading systems  
Adopting a global least cost approach 
New Zealand supports as a guiding principle the achievement of the objectives of the 
Convention at global least cost. The rationale for this principle should be clear - a least 
cost approach allows reductions in emissions to be achieved with least disruption and 
hence offers the greatest scope for durable actions to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations over time. It also reduces the potential tension between the objectives 
of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations, sustainable economic development, and 
equity concerns. 
 
A least cost approach is not just about efficiency since, by minimising overall costs, the 
scope to agree on effective action is maximised. Least cost is about achieving a given 
level of emission reductions at the lowest total cost to society; it does not mean 'no-
cost', or taking no action, to reduce emissions. 
A global least-cost approach is both more efficient and equitable than action behind 
national borders to meet uniform emission targets. Uniform targets can impose very 
high costs on some parties, and low costs on others. A global least cost approach does 
not neglect equity, rather it would both reduce cost disparities and the potential concern 
over absolute costs to individual Parties. A least cost approach therefore provides the 
best hope of achieving a durable outcome acceptable to the widest range of parties, 
thereby minimising environmental and economic uncertainty. In New Zealand's view, 
the proposed principle of global least cost could assist the negotiating process towards 
an agreed outcome. 
 
Clarity about the objective 
Article 2 of the Convention states that stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system is the ultimate objective of the convention. This objective 
supports an approach which seeks to include the following elements: 
 
•  action, where practicable and cost effective, to address all sources and sinks of 
greenhouse gases  
•  basing targets and actions over time on a long term perspective focused on the 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases  
•  recognition of the growing proportion and importance of developing country 
emissions    3
While the primary focus has been on emissions of CO2 globally, other greenhouse 
gases and sinks of CO2 provide significant cost effective opportunities to stabilise 
overall greenhouse gas concentrations. Where practicable and cost effective it makes 
sense to address such opportunities. However, concern has been expressed by some 
about the certainty with which reductions in other greenhouse gases and absorption by 
sinks of CO2 can be verified and sustained. Rather than neglecting such opportunities, 
work is needed to develop practical protocols for the inclusion of the widest possible 
range of sources and sinks of greenhouse gases within the scope of verifiable policy 
actions. 
 
In setting targets for the post-2000 period, Parties should focus on the primary 
objective of the Convention which is to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases, rather than setting potentially unachievable near-term targets as 
endpoints themselves. This does not imply no action now to address emissions. 
However, it does imply a shift in the emphasis of negotiations to achieve a sustainable 
and cost effective outcome over time. While it is important to have flexibility, it is also 
important to establish periodic emissions targets as milestones to lend credibility to any 
agreement. 
 
A focus on the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases points to a need to find 
ways to address developing country emissions post the Conference of Parties in Kyoto. 
While Annex I countries are committed to take the lead, their actions in isolation would 
be likely to prove increasingly ineffective at addressing the objectives of the 
Convention. Developed country parties to the Convention should welcome 
contributions from developing countries on how a transition to effective global action 
might best be achieved in the longer run. Taking a longer term view, and moving to a 
least cost approach which accommodates flexibility over where and when abatement 
occurs, is an important contribution Annex I countries can make towards leadership on 
this issue. 
 
Flexibility and credibility: focus on long term concentrations, not short run 
emissions 
The approach taken on targets and policies and measures are necessarily related. 
Insufficient flexibility in the formulation of targets could limit the scope for least cost 
abatement because of a lack of flexibility over where and when abatement occurs. 
 
Flexibility over where abatement occurs can be achieved by emissions trading 
between parties who meet agreed requirements. Emissions trading allows an efficient 
outcome to be achieved independent of the allocation of total cost among Parties. 
Differentiated commitments are therefore not essential to achieving a global least cost 
outcome. The complexity of differentiated commitments, and the fact that they 
necessarily involve relative winners and losers, make movement on this front difficult. If 
differentiated commitments are considered it is important that this is on the basis of a 
simple principle that reduces the disparity between Parties in terms of the abatement 
costs implied by uniform targets. One possible option would be to aim to share 
commitments in a manner consistent with the outcome expected if marginal abatement 
costs were equalised. Clearly there are a range of options which could reduce cost 
disparities. 
 
Trading can also deliver flexibility over when abatement occurs. However, to achieve 
significant gains from flexibility over when abatement occurs commitments need to be 
developed in cumulative terms (consistent with the concentration objective of the   4
Convention), over a time-frame sufficient to capture changes in technology and 
turnover of the capital stock. Structural rigidities, including existing capital and 
technology, imply that, consistent with a least cost approach over time, relatively small 
initial reductions in emissions may be consistent with meeting a longer term objective. 
This is not an argument for delaying action; rather it is an acknowledgement that the 
initial response may be small, but would increase as new capital investment and 
technology is stimulated by any increase in the relative price of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 
An approach based solely around a longer term concentration target would in principle 
provide full flexibility over when abatement occurs. We recognise, however, that there 
may be tension between the objectives of flexibility and credibility. Including 
intermediate milestones of progress can ensure that parties are committed to achieving 
their agreed cumulative target, but such milestones would need to be set carefully to 
ensure they did not unduly limit flexibility. In the absence of intermediate milestones 
Parties to the Convention, or individual emitters, may delay action, and then 
legitimately claim that meeting the agreed concentration target is likely to be very costly 
given the remaining time available for action. Such strategic behaviour could occur if 
re-negotiation of commitments were anticipated based on the current costs and 
benefits of action. This tension is best addressed in a transparent manner. 
 
One approach to the tension between flexibility and commitment would be to have an 
emissions envelope which became progressively more stringent over time. Figure 1 
shows both cumulative emissions (the top figure), and the rate of emissions (the 
bottom figure). The figures show an emissions envelope, which could be specified, 
equivalently, in terms of either cumulative emissions or the emissions rate. The 
concept is relevant at both the global and national levels, with trading allowing flexibility 
over where and when abatement occurs under the global envelope. 
 
National envelopes could be combined with the ability to bank over-achievement 
relative to the envelope, in order to emit more in the future (banking is represented in 
the lower figure by the hashed areas). The envelope for cumulative emissions would 
never be exceeded at the global level (at the national level emissions trading could 
allow unders and overs relative to the envelope). It is such flexibility over where and 
when that provides for global least cost abatement. We do not support allowing the 
ability to borrow against future commitments as this introduces the scope for deferring 
any action.   5
Figure 1: Indicative cumulative and emissions rate profiles showing a cumulative 




Note: While at the national level emissions could exceed the envelope provided there 
is emissions trading between nations, at the global level the cumulative envelope is a 
binding constraint.  
 
Achieving the objective at least cost 
Solutions should be sought that lead to the convergence rather than divergence over 
time of marginal abatement costs between countries. To do otherwise would place 
disproportionate burdens on some countries and increase the overall global cost. There 
is a risk that this could ultimately jeopardise the sustainability of the Convention. 
 
The source and nature of CO2 emissions suggest that economic instruments are most 
likely to be cost effective in this area. These views are consistent with the IPCC 
Working Group III report which stated that 'At both the national and international levels, 
market-based approaches are likely to be more cost effective than other instruments'. 
However, durable policy solutions require the careful selection of approaches which 
suit the circumstances in question, for example, further work is needed on the scope 
for applying economic instruments to other greenhouse gases and sinks of CO2. 
 
New Zealand has consistently advocated the implementation over time of economic 
instruments internationally. While we consider that economic instruments are likely to 
offer the most cost effective approach to reducing CO2 emissions in a wide range of 
circumstances, international agreement over a given policy approach may neither be 
appropriate or necessary. Provided commitments can be agreed, individual parties 
should be free to respond according to their own assessment of what is least cost in 
accord with individual circumstances. Variations in factors such as the state of 
development, local energy resource costs etc make it unlikely that mandatory 
harmonised policies and measures would be cost effective for all parties. However, we   6
recognise some broad exceptions to this general position, in particular, consistency of 
approach in respect of the following is desirable 
 
•  fossil fuel energy subsidies which are inconsistent with both the intent of the 
Convention, and with maximising economic welfare including the prospects for 
sustainable development - phasing these out should be a high priority and 
deserves consideration as a compulsory measure  
•  the treatment of international aviation and marine bunker fuels may require 
internationally agreed, and probably harmonised action to be taken  
•  protocols for emissions trading which would need to be agreed between parties 
who wished to participate in trading (the right to trade would provide an incentive 
to comply with any such protocol)  
In terms of emissions trading a key feature of a credible approach in the longer term is 
for trade to be against agreed emissions envelopes which ensure that reductions are 
genuine. Unless emissions envelopes apply to all parties participating in trade there 
may be an incentive for trading between parties with and without fixed envelopes to 
occur which may not involve corresponding real emissions reductions (and indeed 
undoes the commitments of those with an agreed envelope). 
 
It is important that Parties give consideration to the requirements of a protocol on 
trading. To encourage such discussion New Zealand puts forward the following two 
examples for further consideration: mechanisms for tracking and validating trades, and 
the formulation of clear rules which would govern changes to the overall allocation or 
target. Tracking and validation are important in order to reduce the transaction costs of 
trade, and to ensure that trades are valid. Clear rules governing changes to the overall 
target would place some constraints on such action, but would facilitate trading and the 
emergence of market based instruments for risk management. We would welcome 
contributions from other parties in this area. 
 